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I. INTRODUCTION 
It might surprise many to learn that under our criminal justice 
system’s guarantee of “innocent until proven guilty,” one could be 
perceived as being a criminal without being charged with a crime.  That, 
however, can be the consequence when prosecutors publicly name 
individuals as unindicted co-conspirators in criminal cases where they 
1
Tayeh: Unindicted Co-Conspirators
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
06 TAYEH MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/15/2014  11:02 AM 
552 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:551 
are not defendants.1 What might be even more surprising is that even if 
the actual defendants in the case are acquitted, publicly named 
unindicted co-conspirators will have no similar remedial benefits of 
procedural exoneration.  Thus, publicly named unindicted co-
conspirators who have not been arrested, indicted, put on trial, nor 
convicted, will forever be branded with a notorious-sounding moniker 
that can cause perpetual harm to their reputations and future employment 
opportunities. 
This Comment posits that the practice of publicly naming 
unindicted co-conspirators before trial violates due process and that 
unless preventative measures are adopted to halt this practice, such due 
process violations will continue.  This conclusion is buttressed by the 
text that follows, which surveys the relevant case law on the rights of 
unindicted co-conspirators, highlights the types of harm that a sample of 
unindicted co-conspirators have suffered as a result of being publicly 
named, and proposes procedures and rules that, if adopted, would 
conform with due process and help prevent these harms. 
Publicly naming unindicted co-conspirators, either in an indictment, 
in pre-trial filings, or during plea hearings, affixes a stigma of criminal 
culpability upon them.  This stigma may result in irreparable harm to 
their reputations, employment prospects, business interests, and ability 
to participate in public life.  Furthermore, once the label attaches, it is 
very hard for unindicted co-conspirators to clear their names.  There is 
no trial that could result in acquittal, nor is there a presumption of 
innocence that protects the rights of unindicted co-conspirators.  In the 
Age of Google, this means that publicly named unindicted co-
conspirators—regardless of the disposition of the underlying case—may 
suffer from a perpetual stigma.  Anytime a potential employer, a client, a 
neighbor, or anyone else types the name of an unindicted co-conspirator 
into a search engine, the results may include information about the 
designation, and in turn impart a negative impression in the mind of the 
inquirer who may restrict, or even altogether forgo, any further 
interaction with the unindicted co-conspirator. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the due process 
dilemma of naming unindicted co-conspirators.  Several circuit courts 
 
* Raeed N. Tayeh, J.D. is a recent graduate of the University of Akron School of Law (Dec. 2013).  
He lives in North Canton, Ohio and can be reached at rtayeh@gmail.com. 
 1.  There is a lack of uniformity as to the spelling of the word co-conspirator.  While some 
courts and commentators hyphenate the word, others do not.  I have chosen to use the hyphenated 
version in the text of the Comment.  However, I have retained the unhyphenated spelling 
(coconspirator) when it is part of a direct quote. 
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and district courts have addressed the issue, and many have attempted to 
fashion remedies that mitigate or reverse the reputational—and other—
harms suffered by unindicted co-conspirators.2  These remedies, 
however, often provide only token relief devoid of any meaningful 
restorative/medial effect.  This issue is a concern at both the federal and 
state level.  However, the scope of this Comment will be limited to the 
federal courts.3 
Given the negative effects that often accompany the designation, 
and given that judicial remedies often prove ineffective at providing 
adequate relief, the practice of naming unindicted co-conspirators can 
and should be curtailed through the adoption of preventative measures, 
as recommended below.  These preventative measures would strike a 
better balance between the government’s interest in prosecuting alleged 
criminals, and the unindicted co-conspirator’s interest in being protected 
against the harms that flow from unwarranted governmental 
stigmatization. 
The practice of naming unindicted co-conspirators has gone on for 
decades, yet there remained a dearth of scholarly writing on the topic 
until 2004, when Professor Ira Robbins wrote his seminal article in 
which he gave thorough treatment to the subject.4  Professor Robbins 
was primarily concerned with the naming of unindicted co-conspirators 
in grand jury indictments, and in turn the reform of the grand jury 
system.5  He argued that “the practice of naming unindicted co-
 
 2.  See United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 688-689 (5th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 688 (1974); United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 804 (5th 
Cir. 1975); In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981); United States v. Johnson, 
225 F. Supp. 2d 982, 982 (N.D. Iowa 2002); United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565, 565 
(S.D. N.Y. 2000); United States v. Santiago, 174 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); United States 
v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1439 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1163, 1165 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 3.  Focusing on the federal courts is important, as Article III courts are the ones that set 
constitutional precedents.  Furthermore, surveying the various practices of all 50 states as it relates 
to the naming of unindicted co-conspirators would require significantly more time than is available 
to this author. 
 4.  Ira Robbins, Guilty Without Charge: Assessing the Due Process Rights of Unindicted Co-
Conspirators, 2004 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 5.  Professor Robbins’s article came out in 2004, and thus it does not analyze many cases 
from the past decade, especially terrorism cases, where the names of unindicted co-conspirators 
were made public in one fashion or another.  See United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 
685, 687 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1322 (M.D. FL 2004); 
United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Marzook, No. 
03-CR-0978, 2005 WL 3095543 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2005); Maryclaire Dale, Philadelphia 
Archdiocese Named “Unindicted Co-Conspirator,” HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:43 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/23/pa-archdiocese-named-unin_n_1224412.html; Patricia 
Hurtado & Katherine Burton, Fifth SAC Capital Fund Manager Tied to Insider Trading, 
3
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conspirators should be prohibited because it violates their due process 
rights,” and that “Congress should bar the use of unindicted co-
conspirators’ real names in grand jury indictments.”6 
In this Comment, I will expand on the work started by Professor 
Robbins and explore several instances in which unindicted co-
conspirators are publicly named—not just when they are named in an 
indictment.  After giving a diagnosis of the problem, I suggest 
prophylactic measures that can prevent due process violations and 
minimize harms to unindicted co-conspirators. 
Part II provides background on the phenomenon of the unindicted 
co-conspirator designation, the utility of this tactic to prosecutors, and 
the due process implications that result from the naming of unindicted 
co-conspirators. 
Part III is divided into two major sections.  Part III.A explores the 
ineffective and inconsistent patchwork of guidelines created by the 
courts in an effort to balance the due process rights of unindicted co-
conspirators against the legitimate interests of the government in 
prosecuting alleged criminals.  Although some of those safeguards and 
remedies can work, this Comment exposes the ones that do not, as well 
as the gaps that remain.  Part III.B highlights the significance of 
ineffective safeguards by exploring the collateral detriments that can 
accompany the public branding of “unindicted co-conspirator.”  This 
will be accomplished by looking at the impact this designation had on 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), a national civil 
rights group that was among 246 designated unindicted co-conspirators 
whose names were mistakenly made public by prosecutors in pre-trial 
filings in a major terrorism case.7 
Part IV proposes procedural changes that strike a better balance 
between the needs of prosecutors to effectively try cases and the due 
process rights of unindicted co-conspirators.  This Comment specifically 
proposes: (1) that the loaded and injurious term of “unindicted co-
conspirator” be universally abandoned and replaced with a more benign 
classification, such as “joint venturer,” “special witness,” or “material 
actor,” (2) that the Justice Department adopt better procedures for 
protecting the rights of unindicted co-conspirators by updating the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual to explicitly prohibit the public naming of unindicted 
 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2012, 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-25/sac-capital-fund-manager-said-to-be-uncharged-
conspirator. 
 6.  Robbins, supra note 4, at *I.3. 
 7.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 687 (5th Cir. 2010). 
4
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co-conspirators in an indictment, and (3) that the relevant rules of 
procedure be changed to require that all pre-trial documents that name 
unindicted co-conspirators be filed under seal. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A criminal conspiracy is “an agreement of two or more persons to 
engage in some form of prohibited conduct.”8  The concept of criminal 
conspiracy is not new to American jurisprudence.9  There are dozens of 
criminal conspiracy statutes in the United States Code, with several of 
them dating back to the Civil War era.10  Yet the detection of a 
conspiracy and the uncovering of the identities of conspirators by 
prosecutors do not mean that all co-conspirators are treated equally.  
Some members of a conspiracy might be indicted and prosecuted, while 
others might escape prosecution (at least for the time being) but 
nonetheless be publicly named or alluded to by prosecutors as unindicted 
co-conspirators. 
A. The Phenomenon of the Unindicted Co-Conspirator 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “unindicted coconspirator” as 
“[a] person who has been identified by law enforcement as a member of 
a conspiracy, but who has not been named in the fellow conspirator’s 
indictment.”11  This definition is a bit misleading because although 
unindicted co-conspirators are not “named” in an indictment in the sense 
that they are not formally charged with committing a crime, they 
certainly might be named in the context of their designation, either by 
the use of their actual names or by the use of generic pseudonyms like 
“Unindicted Co-Conspirator One” or “John Doe.”  Furthermore, the 
designation is not limited to individuals.  Both for-profit and non-profit 
corporations, viewed as “persons” under the law, are susceptible to the 
designation.12 
There are several ways that an unindicted co-conspirator’s actual 
identity might be made public by prosecutors in the course of a criminal 
case.  The naming could occur in the body of the indictment, within the 
 
 8.  Charles Doyle, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41223, FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW, at Summary (2010). 
 9.  Id. at 3. 
 10.  Id. at 2-3. 
 11.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1936 (9th ed. 2009). 
 12.  See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
“a corporation may be liable for . . . conspiracies entered into by its agents and employees.”). 
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text of pre-trial documents, such as a bill of particulars, during a pre-trial 
hearing, or by introducing the unindicted co-conspirator’s statements 
into evidence at trial.13  As noted infra in United States v. Holy Land 
Foundation, a fifth way may be when the names of unindicted co-
conspirators are made public through prosecutorial error.14 
Only identification by the government is at issue here, since it is the 
government that designates individuals as unindicted co-conspirators in 
the course of criminal cases.  The government’s main impetus for 
naming non-defendants as members of a criminal conspiracy, but 
without formally charging them, is grounded in their ability to admit at 
trial evidence that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) states, “(d) A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay . . . (2) The statement is offered against an 
opposing party and . . . (E) Was made by the party’s co-conspirator 
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”15  Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, while an out of court statement by a 
declarant offered into evidence to “prove the truth of the matter 
asserted” will generally be treated as hearsay, such a statement made by 
a co-conspirator “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” 
will not be considered hearsay, and will be admissible at trial, subject to 
limitations within the rules of evidence.16  As with any other admissible 
evidence, a foundation must be laid for admitting statements of co-
conspirators, which means that their identities must be established at 
trial.17 
Professor Robbins identified eight other reasons why prosecutors 
might make public the name of an unindicted co-conspirator: (1) because 
he was charged in a separate case related to the same underlying 
conspiracy, (2) because the government intends to try him in a military 
tribunal (i.e., 9/11 co-conspirators), (3) because he is a sitting U.S. 
president who prosecutors believe, for constitutional reasons, they 
cannot indict (i.e., President Nixon), (4) because he is deceased, (5) 
because prosecutors want to punish him for not cooperating with their 
 
 13.  As discussed infra in Part II.B, these categories do not account for instances when the 
public deduces the identity of a generically identified unindicted co-conspirator from the description 
of that individual in court papers, nor do they include instances where shielded information is 
unlawfully leaked by members of a grand jury or prosecutors.  See generally, James Fox, Jr., The 
Road Not Taken: Criminal Contempt Sanctions and Grand Jury Press Leaks, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 505, 505 (1992). 
 14.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 693 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 15.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 16.  FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c), 801(d)(2)(E). 
 17.  Bourjally v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
6
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investigation, (6) because the statute of limitations has run on the 
crime(s) he allegedly committed, (7) because prosecutors want to punish 
him for invoking the Fifth Amendment during grand jury testimony, or 
(8) because he is a member of a disfavored group.18  “None of [these] 
reasons,” wrote Professor Robbins, “is weighty enough to justify the 
assault on the due process rights of the named individual, and several of 
the reasons plainly constitute abuses of prosecutorial power.”19  This 
argument will be addressed in more detail infra in Part III. 
While some of the reasons given by Professor Robbins—namely 
numbers 5, 7, and 8—seem outrageous if they provide the motivation for 
designating non-parties as unindicted co-conspirators, they sadly are 
within the realm of possibilities.  To ignore these possibilities would be 
to ignore the very existence of prosecutorial misconduct no matter how 
seldom it occurs.  However, it should also be acknowledged that 
individual misconduct is an aberration that should not be unfairly 
imputed to the mainstream of federal prosecutors, who are not only 
officers of the court, but also officers of the law. 
B.  Due Process Implications 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands 
that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”20  The due process concerns raised by naming unindicted co-
conspirators are twofold.  First, there is a concern about the government 
formally implicating someone in a criminal conspiracy without 
providing him/her a forum to respond.  Accusing someone of “criminal 
conduct without affording him a forum for vindication” works to 
obliterate the “presumption of innocence,” which is a bedrock of 
procedural due process.21 
Second, the collateral detriments caused to reputational, 
employment, and other interests raise concerns about deprivations of 
liberty and property interests without due process.  As stated succinctly 
by the American Civil Liberties Union, “Individuals and organizations 
have a Fifth Amendment right to be free of government-imposed stigma 
 
 18.  Robbins, supra note 4, at *III.A.1-10.  While Professor Robbins analyzes these reasons in 
the context of naming an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment itself, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that they equally apply to making names public at any stage of a criminal case.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at *III.A.1. 
 20.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 21.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). 
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against their good names and reputations.”22  It would be unrealistic to 
deny that an accusation, even if unfounded, that one has committed a 
serious felony may impinge upon employment opportunities.”23 
i.  Reputational Harm 
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,24 the Supreme Court held that 
“[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential.”25  Constantineau arose out of a 
state statute that allowed police, without prior notice or hearing, to post 
on the walls of liquor stores the names of excessive drinkers to whom 
the sale or delivery of alcohol was forbidden.26  In holding that the 
statute violated due process, the Court focused on the impact that 
inclusion on a posting had: “it is a stigma, an official branding of a 
person . . . [and] [o]nly when the whole proceedings leading to the 
pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results 
be prevented.”27 
Within five years the Supreme Court took a dramatic turn away 
from Constantineau, holding in Paul v. Davis28 that injury to reputation 
caused by government actors is not enough to invoke the Due Process 
Clause.29  The plaintiff in that case claimed that his inclusion on a list of 
“Active Shoplifters” distributed by police to local merchants was 
defamatory and that it violated his “liberty” interest in his reputation.30  
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist stated: 
[T]he interest in reputation . . . is neither “liberty” nor “property” guar-
anteed against state deprivation without due process of law . . . [and] 
reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as em-
ployment . . . [is not] sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of 
the Due Process Clause.31 
 
 22.  Unindicted Co-Conspirators and the Presumption of Innocence, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, June 18, 2008, www.aclu.org/national-security/unindicted-co-conspirators-and-
presumption-innocence. 
 23.  United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 24.  Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 433 (1971). 
 25.  Id. at 437. 
 26.  Id. at 434-35. 
 27.  Id. at 437. 
 28.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 693 (1976). 
 29.  Id. at 712. 
 30.  Id. at 697-98. 
 31.  Id. at 701, 711. 
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The Court defined “liberty” and “property” interests comprehended 
under the Due Process Clause as those that “have been initially 
recognized and protected by state law.”32  Because the plaintiff’s interest 
in reputation was not a right guaranteed by state law, he was not entitled 
to the protections of due process.33 
Justice Rehnquist distinguished Constantineau on the grounds that 
the plaintiff in that case was not only stigmatized by governmental 
action, but she was also deprived of “a right previously held under state 
law the (sic) right to purchase or obtain liquor in common with the rest 
of the citizenry.”34  What emerged from this opinion was a “stigma-plus” 
test that essentially requires procedural due process when government 
stigmatization is accompanied by injury to a more tangible harm that 
would fall under the “liberty” or “property” categories of the Fifth 
Amendment.35  Stigmatization alone could not be enough. 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the majority’s holding 
“has a hollow ring in light of the Court’s acceptance of the truth of the 
allegation that the ‘active shoplifter’ label would ‘seriously impair 
(respondent’s) future employment opportunities.”36  In conducting a 
thorough review of the Court’s previous holdings, Justice Brennan 
concluded: 
Our precedents clearly mandate that a person’s interest in his good 
name and reputation is cognizable as a “liberty” interest within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause, and the Court has simply failed to 
distinguish those precedents in any rational manner in holding that no 
invasion of a “liberty” interest was effected in the official stigmatizing 
of respondent as a criminal without any “process” whatsoever.37 
Justice Brennan took exception with the majority’s reading of 
Constantineau, and its focus on the plaintiff’s loss of her previously held 
right to purchase liquor as a basis for adopting the stigma-plus test.  He 
reminded his colleagues of the words of the majority in that case: 
The Only (sic) issue present here is whether the label or characteriza-
tion given a person by “posting,” though a mark of serious illness to 
some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural 
 
 32.  Id. at 710. 
 33.  Id. at 712. 
 34.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976). 
 35.  Eric Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 81 (2009). 
 36.  Davis, 424 U.S. at 734 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. at 734. 
9
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due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.38 
The criticism generated by Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was “immediate, 
extensive, and scathing.”39  Regardless, though, of the stigma v. stigma-
plus debate that emerged after Paul v. Davis, the weight of authority, as 
detailed in the cases discussed below, establishes that the public naming 
of unindicted co-conspirators in any pre-trial context is a violation of 
due process.  This view meets Justice Brennan’s test since implicating 
someone as being involved in a criminal conspiracy is certainly 
governmental stigmatization that can cause reputational harm. 
More importantly, the view that naming unindicted co-conspirators 
violates due process also meets Justice Rehnquist’s stigma-plus test 
because the stigmatization is done by federal prosecutors in the context 
of a criminal trial where a fundamental liberty interest is impinged—the 
interest in not being accused of wrongdoing in the course of a criminal 
proceeding without being formally charged and afforded the guarantees 
of due process. 
The contemporary debate over the propriety and implications of 
naming unindicted co-conspirators in grand jury indictments dates back 
to the Watergate scandal and the naming of President Richard Nixon as 
an unindicted co-conspirator in the grand jury indictment returned 
against seven defendants.40  The seven defendants in United States v. 
Nixon were charged with “conspiracy to defraud the United States and to 
obstruct justice.”41  The special prosecutor investigating Watergate 
issued a subpoena duces tecum demanding that Nixon hand over certain 
documents and recordings.42  Nixon moved to quash the subpoena but 
his motion was denied.43 
The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s denial of Nixon’s 
motion to quash the subpoena.  At the same time, the Court refused to 
address the designation of the President as an unindicted co-
conspirator.44  As Professor Robbins explains: 
Although this case afforded the United States Supreme Court the op-
portunity to rule on the question of whether a grand jury had the power 
to name a sitting President—or anyone else—as an unindicted co-
conspirator, the Court instead resolved President Nixon’s privilege 
 
 38.  Id. at 730 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971)). 
 39.  Mitnick, supra note 35, at 81. 
 40.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 (1974). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 683. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 687 n.2, 702. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/6
06 TAYEH MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/15/2014  11:02 AM 
2014] UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATORS 561 
claim without ruling on the practice of naming unindicted co-
conspirators.45 
Within a year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon, the Fifth Circuit 
issued its landmark opinion in United States v. Briggs, a case of first 
impression in the circuit, holding that the naming of unindicted co-
conspirators in a grand jury indictment was “a denial of due process.”46 
The due process concerns raised by Briggs and its progeny have 
had a significant impact on the procedures followed by prosecutors.  
Subsequent to these cases, the United States Attorneys’ Manual 
(“USAM”) was updated with a section titled, “Limitation on Naming 
Persons as Unindicted Co-Conspirators,” which states: 
Ordinarily, there is no need to name a person as an unindicted co-
conspirator in an indictment in order to fulfill any legitimate prosecu-
torial interest or duty.  For purposes of indictment itself, it is sufficient, 
for example, to allege that the defendant conspired with “another per-
son or persons known.”  The identity of the person can be supplied, 
upon request, in a bill of particulars . . . . With respect to the trial, the 
person’s identity and status as a co-conspirator can be established, for 
evidentiary purposes, through the introduction of proof sufficient to 
invoke the co-conspirator hearsay exception without subjecting the 
person to the burden of a formal accusation by a grand jury.  In the ab-
sence of some significant justification, federal prosecutors generally 
should not identify unindicted co-conspirators in conspiracy indict-
ments.47 
These guidelines tacitly recognize the harm that could result from 
naming an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment, but they are 
merely advisory and subject to the discretion of individual federal 
prosecutors who are free to decide on their own what constitutes 
“significant justification” for making an exception to the preferred 
practice.48  The lack of clearer guidance and uniform standards may 
allow for inconsistencies to develop across jurisdictions.49 
 
 45.  Robbins, supra note 4, at *II.C.1 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 n.2 
(1974)). 
 46.  United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 47.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-11.130 (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 48.  Hypothetically speaking, some U.S. Attorneys might use a categorical approach in 
determining what qualifies as “significant justification.”  Allegations of terrorism, public corruption, 
or organized criminal activity might justify the naming of unindicted co-conspirators.  Others might 
use a case-by-case assessment, looking for particular unusual circumstances to base their decisions 
upon. 
 49.  Whether actual inconsistencies across jurisdictions in regards to the threshold at which 
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The preference for not naming unindicted co-conspirators in 
indictments has given rise to practices that are putatively meant to 
ensure anonymity, such as the use of generic labels like “John Doe” or 
“Unindicted Co-Conspirator One.”50  Such measures, however, do not 
always prove successful in protecting the identity—and more 
importantly the reputation—of the unindicted co-conspirator.  While the 
USAM explains that “it is sufficient, for example, to allege that the 
defendant conspired with ‘another person or persons known,’”51 the 
level of specificity used in describing unnamed unindicted co-
conspirators is left to the discretion of prosecutors. 
For example, in 2003 the identity of a person labeled as 
“Unindicted Co-conspirator One” in a major terrorism case was revealed 
by a journalist who compared descriptions from the indictment about 
statements that “Unindicted Co-conspirator One” made with a video 
released by the government showing the exact same statements being 
made by Fawaz Damra, a high profile Imam from Cleveland, Ohio.52 
In 2012, Bloomberg News ran a story identifying Michael 
Steinberg, a hedge fund manager with SAC Capital, as being one of 
several unnamed unindicted co-conspirators referenced in an indictment 
that charged several defendants with securities fraud.53  In pre-trial 
papers filed with the court, the government wrote that one of the 
unnamed unindicted co-conspirators in the case was “‘the portfolio 
manager to whom [defendant] Jon Horvath reported at his hedge 
fund.’”54  That Horvath reported to Steinberg was a fact easily 
obtainable by journalists armed with such detailed information. 
Steinberg was subsequently indicted on conspiracy and securities 
fraud charges, but whether or not the government intentionally described 
Steinberg to make his name easily discoverable by the public is 
 
U.S. Attorneys will permit the naming of unindicted co-conspirators in an indictment is a subject 
that requires surveying all 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices, an effort that is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but one that nonetheless can be the topic of future scholarship.  United States Attorneys 
Listing, OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Feb. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/usattorneys.html. 
 50.  See United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1349 (M.D. FL 2004). 
 51.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47. 
 52.  See Sabrina Eaton, Imam Here Is Linked to Terror Suspect, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Feb. 21, 2003, at A1. 
 53.  Hurtado & Burton, supra note 5. 
 54.  Ginger Adams Otis, SAC Capital Portfolio Manager Steinberg Indicted on Insider-
Trading Charges, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/sac-capital-portfolio-manager-steinberg-arrested-ny-
article-1.1302415#commentpostform. 
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unknown.55  On the one hand, prosecutors could have merely been 
careless about protecting Steinberg’s identity.  On the other hand, they 
could have intended for his name to be discoverable, perhaps, to 
pressure him into cooperating, or to punish him for not cooperating.  
Either way, the government’s actions fueled widespread speculation 
about Steinberg’s culpability in a major insider-trading scandal, and 
likely contributed to Steinberg’s suspension at SAC Capital prior to his 
indictment.56 
Steinberg’s subsequent indictment should not be used to 
retroactively excuse the violation of his due process rights by 
constructively naming him in court papers as a party to a criminal 
conspiracy.  As the court in In re Smith noted in discussing the naming 
of a third party as an unindicted co-conspirator in factual resumes 
presented at two separate plea hearings: 
Regardless of what criminal charges may have been contemplated . . . 
against the Petitioner for the future, we completely fail to perceive how 
the interests of criminal justice were advanced at the time of the plea 
hearings by such an attack on the Petitioner’s character . . . . The pre-
sumption of innocence, to which every criminal defendant is entitled, 
was forgotten by the Assistant United States Attorney in . . . im-
plicat[ing] the Petitioner in criminal conduct without affording him a 
forum for vindication.57 
By failing to impose limits on the level of specificity used in describing 
unindicted co-conspirators in indictments, the USAM opens the door to 
undue specificity whose effect is equivalent to naming such individuals.  
This gap in the guidelines will continue to open the door to breaches of 
the manual’s apparent aspirational standard of not publicly identifying 
unindicted co-conspirators. 
III. PRE-TRIAL NAMING OF UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATORS VIOLATES 
DUE PROCESS 
In the absence of any Supreme Court decision on the due process 
 
 55.  Peter Lattman, SAC Capital Manager Awaits Word on Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2013, 8:42 PM, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/sac-capital-manager-awaits-word-on-
charges/.  Steinberg was ultimately tried by a jury in late 2013 and convicted of conspiracy and 
securities fraud.  Christopher Mathews, SAC’s Steinberg Convicted in Insider-Trading Case, WALL 
ST. J., DEC. 18, 2013, 9:16 PM, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304773104579266554036539982. 
 56.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 57.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981). 
13
Tayeh: Unindicted Co-Conspirators
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
06 TAYEH MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/15/2014  11:02 AM 
564 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:551 
rights of unindicted co-conspirators,58 lower courts have pieced together 
a patchwork of guiding principles, which can be summarized as follows: 
(1) the government should not publicly name unindicted co-conspirators 
in an indictment or information,59 (2) the government should not 
publicly name unindicted co-conspirators in factual resumes read aloud 
during plea hearings,60 (3) the government may name unindicted co-
conspirators in pre-trial filings, but those documents should be filed 
under seal,61 and (4) the government is free to publicly name unindicted 
co-conspirators at trial for the purpose of submitting evidence under the 
hearsay exception for statements of co-conspirators.62 
Despite their strengthening over the years, these guidelines fail to 
provide adequate protection of due process rights, and where adopted, 
they are often applied inconsistently.  Stronger rules and procedures are 
needed to guarantee that the due process rights of unindicted co-
conspirators are better protected.  To fully appreciate precisely how due 
process rights are implicated, it is important to address the ineffective 
and inconsistent patchwork of law that exists, the collateral detriments 
suffered by many unindicted co-conspirators, and the difficulty faced by 
unindicted co-conspirators in obtaining meaningful remedial relief. 
A. An Ineffective and Inconsistent Patchwork of Law 
i. Naming in the Indictment 
In United States v. Briggs, the Fifth Circuit declared it a violation of 
due process to name unindicted co-conspirators in indictments.  This 
was a landmark decision that sparked a broader discussion about the 
constitutional rights of third parties who are named participants in a 
criminal conspiracy, but for whom there is no forum for vindication.63 
The particular issue in Briggs was collateral to a highly publicized 
case where several individuals were indicted for, among other things, 
violating a slew of federal criminal conspiracy statutes in connection 
with political demonstrations and disruptions that took place at the 1972 
 
 58.  The Supreme Court has considered whether a sitting President can be named as an 
unindicted coconspirator in an indictment, but it has not heard cases specifically addressing the due 
process rights of ordinary citizens who are named as unindicted co-conspirators.  See United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 683 (1974). 
 59.  See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 60.  See In re Smith, 656 F.2d at 1101. 
 61.  See United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 693 (5th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1166 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 62.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 805; Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 63.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 806; Robbins, supra note 4, at *II.B.5. 
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Republican Party National Convention in Miami.64  In addition to 
naming more than a half-dozen criminal defendants as alleged co-
conspirators, Count One of the indictment identified, by name, three 
unindicted co-conspirators.65  Two of the three unindicted co-
conspirators filed a pre-trial petition with the court “seeking entry of an 
order expunging the references to them in . . . the indictment.”66  The 
judge denied the petition, accepting the government’s argument that 
“since petitioners were not named as defendants they lacked standing to 
object to the contents of the indictment.”67  While the petitioners’ case 
was pending on appeal, the defendants in the underlying conspiracy case 
were tried, and were all acquitted.68 
The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the motion and 
directed the lower court to issue an order expunging petitioners’ names 
from the indictment.69  In balancing the injuries suffered by the 
petitioners against the importance to the government of having the 
ability to name unindicted co-conspirators within an indictment, the 
court struggled to “discern what legitimate interests of the government 
are served by stigmatizing private citizens as criminals while not naming 
them as defendants or affording in this case, indeed, affirmatively 
opposing access to any forum for vindication.”70 
In deciding that the petitioners did in fact have standing to 
challenge their being named in the indictment, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The government’s position . . . is founded upon its argument that since 
the appellants were not indicted, and particularly since those named as 
defendants were acquitted, the formal branding of appellants as alleged 
felons and as participants in a distasteful conspiracy is a mere chimera, 
neither substantial nor injurious.  This is at least disingenuous.71 
The court emphasized the constitutional implications of the petitioners’ 
“complaint of injury to their . . . reputations and impairment of their 
 
 64.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 794, 796. 
 65.  Id. at 797; see generally, Greg Bruno, 4 of the Gainesville Eight Reunite After 30 Years, 
GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 31, 2003, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20030831/LOCAL/ 
208310337. 
 66.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 797. 
 67.  Id. at 797 n.2. 
 68.  Id. at 797. 
 69.  Id. at 808. 
 70.  Id. at 804. 
 71.  Id. at 797 (emphasis added).  The government argued that there was no justiciable case or 
controversy, that appellants did not have standing, and that the acquittal of all defendants who were 
indicted under Count One rendered the appellants’ petition moot. Id. 
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ability to obtain employment” as a result of being implicated in a 
criminal conspiracy without being offered a forum to be heard.  It 
reasoned that personal reputation and employment are, “substantial and 
legally cognizable interests entitled to constitutional protection against 
official governmental action that debases them.”72 
The court critically observed that “[t]he government defies common 
sense with its theory that one’s interests are not adversely affected to any 
extent by being publicly branded as a felon so long as he is not named as 
a defendant for trial,” and that the theory that the “media” was to blame, 
rather than the government, for any injuries suffered by the petitioners is 
“frivolous.”73  Furthermore, the court dismissed as “mere speculation” 
the government’s theory that the exoneration and vindication of the 
defendants in the criminal trial by way of their acquittal “rubs off” on 
the petitioners and “ameliorates their injury,” especially given the fact 
that an unindicted co-conspirator could be indicted at any time, 
regardless of the acquittal of previously indicted co-conspirators.74 
The government argued that “the interest of justice may on 
occasion require that [unindicted co-conspirators] be named in the 
indictment,” but without giving concrete examples of what exactly those 
interests were.75  On its own, the court hypothesized about what those 
interests might be, and upon weighing each putative government interest 
against the injury caused to named unindicted co-conspirators, the court 
concluded, “The balance tips wholly in favor of the adversely affected 
appellants.  The scope of due process afforded them was not 
sufficient.”76 
In considering the petitioners’ sought-after remedy (e.g., deletion of 
their names from the record), the court held that it was well within the 
power of federal courts to “expunge unauthorized grand jury actions,” 
and that such orders were not without precedent.77  Treating the case as a 
 
 72.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 797.  “The public ignominy of being accused of a crime is one of the 
factors underlying the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial,” and “[o]ne’s right to hold specific 
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference comes within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 
799. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.  The court used a play on words in describing this theory as “innocence by 
association.”  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 804. 
 76.  Id. at 806.  In considering what arguments the government might have made to support 
its position, the court reasoned that there was no “necessity” in naming unindicted co-conspirators 
to prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy since the conspiracy could be proved with 
evidence.”  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 806-07. 
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petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the court not only vacated the district 
court’s denial of equitable relief, it instructed the lower court to “order 
that the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Florida expunge from Count One of the indictment . . . all 
references to appellants.”78 
ii. Naming in Pre-Trial Documents or During Hearings 
While today, the naming of unindicted co-conspirators in an 
indictment is both universally disfavored and rare in application, there 
exists uncertainty, as well as inconsistency, regarding the naming of 
unindicted co-conspirators in pre-trial documents or hearings—most 
notably, but not exclusively, the bill of particulars.  When Briggs was 
decided in 1975, the Fifth Circuit was of the view that naming 
unindicted co-conspirators in a bill of particulars did not implicate due 
process rights the way that naming someone as such in an indictment did 
because the bill of particulars is a “statement of the prosecutor and does 
not carry the imprimatur of credibility that official grand jury action 
does.”79  The court seemed satisfied that the risk of a serious “public 
impact” upon an unindicted co-conspirator’s reputation could be 
“tempered by protective orders entered by the court.” 
Since Briggs, the circuits have split on the question of whether to 
grant motions for bills of particulars that name unindicted co-
conspirators.80  The Second Circuit, for example, has affirmed both 
decisions granting such motions and decisions denying such motions.81  
In United States v. Nachamie, for example, a district court judge held 
that defendants were entitled to discover the names of unindicted co-
conspirators after considering several factors used by other courts in 
deciding whether to grant a motion for a bill of particulars that seeks to 
uncover the identities of unnamed unindicted co-conspirators.82  These 
factors included: (1) the total number of alleged co-conspirators, known 
and unknown, (2) the duration and breadth of the alleged conspiracy, (3) 
whether the government has otherwise provided adequate notice of 
particulars, (4) the volume of pre-trial disclosures, (5) the potential 
danger to co-conspirators from revelation of their identities, and (6) the 
potential harm to the government’s investigation that might result if 
 
 78.  Briggs, 514 F.2d at 808. 
 79.  Id. at 806. 
 80.  See United States v. Johnson, 225 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (discussing the 
split in authority). 
 81.  United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).  
 82.  Id. 
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certain identities are revealed.83 
In more complex cases, where “a seemingly unprecedented and 
unique burden [is placed] on the Defendants and their counsel in trying 
to answer the charges that have been made against them,”84 other courts 
have considered factors such as the “geographical scope”85 of the 
conspiracy, “the large number of schemes alleged,”86 “the wide-ranging 
nature of the predicate acts of the co-conspirators,”87 and allegations 
within the indictment of the use of “numerous aliases, code names, and 
coded communications” by the co-conspirators.88 
The Fifth Circuit applied the Briggs balancing test in In re Smith, a 
case in which a third party to two related bribery cases, who was neither 
indicted nor formally designated as an unindicted co-conspirator, was 
nonetheless named by the government during a plea hearing as having 
participated in a criminal conspiracy.89  Smith was the head of the Army 
and Air Force Exchange Service (“AAFES”), headquartered in Dallas.90  
Federal prosecutors had launched an investigation into an alleged 
bribery scheme involving “AAFES employees, government contractors, 
and military sales representatives.”91  The investigation led to dozens of 
arrests and some 26 convictions.92  Among those convicted were two 
corporations, each of which pleaded guilty to charges of bribing an 
AAFES purchasing agent.93 
At each of the separate plea hearings for the corporate defendants, 
the federal prosecutor read into the record and filed with the court a 
factual resume that identified Smith, by name, as someone other than the 
AAFES purchasing agent named in the felony information who received 
bribe money from the defendants.94 
The allegation that Smith, the head of a military agency, was 
accepting bribes resulted in months of adverse media coverage, and led 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 235 (S.D. N.Y. 2000). 
 85.  Id. at 234.  In this pre-911 indictment, the government accused Usama Bin Laden and 
others of being involved in a conspiracy, the geographical scope of which spanned 4 continents, 12 
countries, and 4 U.S. states.  Id. 
 86.  United States v. Santiago, 174 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  United States v. Fariz, No. 8:03-CR-77-T-30TBM, 2005 WL 3499043 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 
2005). 
 89.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981).  
 90.  Id. at 1103. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 1102.  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
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Smith to file motions with each of the judges in the two separate cases 
seeking that either his name be stricken from the record of the plea 
hearings and the factual resumes, or that those portions of the record be 
placed under seal.95  Smith argued that naming him was irrelevant to the 
plea hearing, that it harmed his reputation, and that the government was 
singling him out only for “publicity purposes.”96  The government 
opposed the motions, arguing essentially that irreparable damage was 
already done to Smith’s reputation, and that granting relief would be a 
“fruitless gesture.”97 
Both judges denied Smith’s motions without issuing an opinion.98  
Smith retired from AAFES three days after being denied relief.99  In 
addition to his retirement pay, he was supposed to receive an annuity on 
account of his participation in AAFES’s Executive Management 
Program (“EMP”), but he was informed that he was suspended from 
EMP because of the allegations made against him in the government’s 
factual resumes, and that the annuity would be “held in abeyance 
pending further AAFES proceedings.”100 
Smith then petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus from the Court of 
Appeals, asking that it order the two district court judges to either strike 
the record of his name or seal those portions of the record where his 
name appeared.101  The Court of Appeals granted the petition and 
ordered that the District Clerk for the Northern District of Texas 
“permanently obliterate and strike from the records of the pleas of 
guilty . . . any and all identifying reference to or name of Mr. Smith,” 
and that “all pleadings, records, documents, orders and other papers 
concerning Petitioner’s Motion to Strike and Seal . . . [and] Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus be sealed.”102 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on Briggs in 
finding that “the inclusion of Mr. Smith’s name in the factual resumes 
were a violation of his liberty and property rights . . . [and] that 
Petitioner’s motions to strike and seal should have been granted in the 
proceedings below.”103  The court stated that there was “no reason to 
distinguish between an official defamation originating from a federal 
 
 95.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d at 1104. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 1105. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d at 1105. 
 102.  Id. at 1107. 
 103.  Id. at 1106-07. 
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grand jury or an Assistant United States Attorney.”104 
To the government’s insistence that “Briggs only forbids the 
naming of unindicted coconspirators by a federal grand jury,” the court 
responded: 
The point made in the Briggs decision is that no legitimate governmen-
tal interest is served by an official public smear of an individual when 
that individual has not been provided a forum in which to vindicate his 
rights . . . . The Briggs decision would be rendered meaningless if it 
could be so easily circumvented by the actions of an Assistant United 
States Attorney.105 
In attempting to balance the interests of the government against the harm 
done to Smith, the court could find no legitimate basis for naming Smith 
in the factual resumes: Smith appeared before the grand jury, he was 
never charged with a crime, he was not implicated during either court’s 
determination of the factual basis for the defendants’ guilty pleas, and 
neither of the corporate defendants’ representatives testimony included 
any mention of bribing Smith.106 
Not only did the Fifth Circuit follow Briggs, it expanded it by 
holding that, just as in the case of an indictment, the naming of an 
unindicted co-conspirator in a factual resume filed by prosecutors and 
read aloud during a plea hearing tramples upon the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process.107 
In United States v. Anderson, three healthcare lawyers referenced in 
an indictment as “unnamed, unindicted coconspirators,” had their names 
made public in pre-trial papers filed by prosecutors.108  The lawyers 
were well known, and their being named as unindicted co-conspirators 
in a high-profile Medicare fraud case was “notoriously reported in the 
legal and healthcare community.”109 
Petitioners, claiming injury to their reputations as a result of the 
public disclosure of their names, sought an order to expunge the record 
of any references to them by name as unindicted co-conspirators.110  The 
 
 104.  Id. at 1106. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d at 1107.  
 108.  United States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1165 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 109.  Id. at 1165-66. 
 110.  Id. at 1165.  Petitioner Kaiser sought other relief, including a finding that her due process 
rights were violated, and a finding that the evidence in the case proved that she acted in good faith 
and was not a member of an illegal conspiracy.  Id.  Petitioners Holden and Queen, apart from 
Kaiser, asked for a finding that not only did they not participate in an unlawful conspiracy, they in 
fact acted appropriately and legally.  Id. 
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district court adopted the balancing test from Briggs and concluded that 
“movants suffered a violation of due process when the government 
publicly named them in its moving papers,” and that “[t]he very real 
stigmatization suffered by the movants from this government action far 
outweighs the nonexistent government interest in publicly naming them 
as coconspirators.”111  Granting only part of the relief sought by 
petitioners, the judge ordered that all references to petitioners’ names be 
expunged from pre-trial records. 
The judge denied the petitioners’ request for declaratory relief, but 
did, however, make explicit reference to statements he made from the 
bench during trial: “Certainly . . . there was no evidence that led this 
court to believe they were involved in criminal activity . . . . These 
transcript excerpts reflect the court’s views concerning the evidence at 
trial better than any post hoc findings ever could.”112  These statements 
effectively exonerated the petitioners from any criminal conduct, albeit 
in a roundabout fashion that was less authoritative and formal than the 
petitioners might have hoped for. 
iii. Naming at Trial 
While the court in Briggs saw no valid reason for naming 
unindicted co-conspirators in the context of a grand jury indictment, it 
did state that “wholly different, and valid, governmental interests 
[justified] naming the private citizen . . . in trial testimony.”113  The 
Briggs court reasoned that the reputational harm done to a named 
unindicted co-conspirator in these situations was tolerable, as the 
testimony at trial of an unindicted co-conspirator “makes no formal 
adjudication regarding criminality.”114 
In accordance with the opinion in Briggs, the court in Anderson 
found no impropriety in naming unindicted co-conspirators at trial for 
purposes of presenting evidence under the hearsay exception for co-
conspirators, stating, “The government clearly had a substantial interest 
in identifying these coconspirators for 801(d)(2)(E) purposes . . . . [This] 
interest outweighed the movants’ private injuries because their private 
injuries, while important, must yield to the proper administration of 
criminal justice under these circumstances.”115 
 
 111.  Id. at 1168 (emphasis added). 
 112.  Id. at 1170-71. 
 113.  United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 805 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  United States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1169 (D. Kan. 1999). 
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The court drew what it called an “important distinction” between 
being “unqualifiedly” labeled as an unindicted co-conspirator in moving 
papers verses being labeled as such for evidentiary purposes, reasoning 
that “[an] 801(d)(2)(E) coconspirator is not necessarily a criminal.  All 
that is required is that he or she be a ‘joint venturer’ in a common 
plan.”116  It was the court’s view that identifying co-conspirators at trial 
for 801(d)(2)(E) purposes under the assertion that the co-conspirators are 
really joint venturers “does not allow for the reasonable inference that 
they are criminals,” whereas “the government’s unqualified 
identification of the movants as unindicted coconspirators in its pretrial 
moving papers allows for the reasonable inference that they have been 
labeled criminals.”117 
While courts have made distinctions about when the naming of an 
unindicted co-conspirator is and is not a violation of due process, there is 
no denying that the violation of an unindicted co-conspirator’s due 
process rights is in-and-of-itself a harm.  This harm can, and often does, 
lead to other harms that have serious and tangible consequences for 
unindicted co-conspirators. 
B. Collateral Detriments to Being Named an Unindicted Co-Conspirator 
The Briggs balancing test of weighing the government’s interests 
against the interests of unindicted co-conspirators necessarily takes into 
account both the harms that have occurred as well as the harms that still 
may occur after an unindicted co-conspirator is publicly named.  These 
harms can be both unpredictable and substantial. 
Being publicly named as an unindicted co-conspirator in a criminal 
case can have far-reaching consequences, especially if the case involves 
terrorism.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 118 for example, is a 
high profile and multifaceted case involving the naming of unindicted 
co-conspirators.  The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
(“HLF”) was a Texas-based charity that distributed millions of dollars a 
year in humanitarian relief across the globe.119  On Dec. 3, 2001, the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control listed HLF as a 
Specially Designated Terrorist organization amid accusations that the 
charity provided unlawful financial support to the Palestinian group 
 
 116.  Id. at 1169 (citing United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1398 (9th Cir. 1988)); United 
States v. Saimiento Rozo, 676 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 
1169, 1174 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 117.  Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70. 
 118.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 685 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 119.  United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 483 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Hamas, which itself had been designated by the government as a foreign 
terrorist organization in 1995.120  The government shut down HLF by 
blocking its bank accounts, seizing its assets, and making transactions 
with the organization illegal.121 
In 2004, a grand jury returned a 42-count indictment against HLF 
and seven of its directors, employees, and volunteers, accusing them of, 
inter alia, conspiring to provide financial support to Hamas.122  Two 
months prior to the start of the 2007 trial, the government filed a brief 
giving its theory of the case, and describing the breadth of the alleged 
conspiracy as follows: 
[T]he focal point of this case is the designated terrorist group Ha-
mas . . . . Although the indictment in this case charges the seven named 
individual defendants and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development, it will be obvious that the defendants . . . were operating 
in concert with a host of individuals and organizations dedicated to 
sustaining and furthering the Hamas movement.  A list of unindicted 
coconspirators is attached to this . . . brief.123 
The above-referenced attachment to the pre-trial brief (Attachment A) 
listed, by name, 246 individuals and organizations as unindicted co-
conspirators.  Among the listed unindicted co-conspirators were three 
organizations: the Islamic Society of North America (“ISNA”),124 the 
North American Islamic Trust (“NAIT”),125 and the Council on 
 
 120.  Id. at 483, 488. 
 121.  Id. at 541; Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019, 
1033 (9th Cir. 2011) (“By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic 
operations of an entity.  All assets are frozen.  No person or organization may conduct any business 
whatsoever with the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense.”)  
(citation omitted). 
 122.  Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft: Holy Land Indictment, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (July 27, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2004/72704ag.htm.  The 
indictment, despite Attorney General Ashcroft’s speech, did not accuse the defendants of funding 
violent activities.  Id.  Only five of the men charged were arrested and tried; the other two were 
declared fugitives.  Id.  The theory was that by providing humanitarian support to charities in 
Palestine that were allegedly controlled by Hamas, HLF was helping the organization bolster its 
standing among the Palestinian people, and helping to free up Hamas resources that could be 
redirected toward violent resistance of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.  Id. 
 123.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
added).  
 124.  ISNA is the largest association of Muslims in North America.  Islamic Society of North 
America (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/About-ISNA-HQ.aspx. 
 125.  NAIT is an endowment that holds in trust the deeds of more than 325 mosques and 
Islamic schools across 42 states.  NAIT Waqf Services, NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST (Nov. 21, 
2012), http://www.nait.net/waqfservice.htm. 
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American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR”).126 
The HLF case was tried in the Northern District of Texas, which is 
within the Fifth Circuit.  Publicly filing Attachment A violated the rule 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in In re Smith that pre-trial filings that name 
unindicted co-conspirators must be filed under seal to protect the due 
process rights of those not charged in the indictment.127  The government 
would later concede that not filing Attachment A under seal was an 
“unfortunate oversight.”128 
After the first case ended in a mistrial, and before the second trial 
began, ISNA and NAIT petitioned the trial court for equitable relief, 
citing the government’s violation of their due process rights by publicly 
naming them as unindicted co-conspirators.129  The demands for relief 
included: (1) a public declaration that the organizations’ constitutional 
rights had been violated, (2) an order expunging from all public 
government filings any mention of the organizations as unindicted co-
conspirators, and (3) an injunction preventing the government from 
further naming the organizations as unindicted co-conspirators without 
judicial leave.130  CAIR joined the suit as amicus and requested 
expungement of the names of all 246 unindicted co-conspirators from 
Attachment A.131 
The district court found that the government’s publication of 
Attachment A violated the organizations’ due process rights and ordered 
that “Attachment A and ‘all pleadings, records, documents, orders, and 
other papers . . . including this Order’” be sealed.132  Despite the finding 
 
 126.  CAIR is the largest Muslim civil rights organization in the United States.  Homepage. 
COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/ 
VisionMissionCorePrinciples.aspx. 
 127.  Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 688, 692 (citing In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 
Unit A Sept. 1981)). 
 128.  Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 688. 
 129.  Id. at 688-89 n1.  This was the largest terrorism-financing case in the history of the U.S., 
with the first trial ending in a hung jury.  Greg Krikorian, Weak Case Seen in Failed Trial of 
Charity, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/04/nation/na-holyland4.  
The government came under criticism from several of the jurors, as well as outside experts and 
observers, for the weakness of the government’s case, which followed a 15-year, multimillion-dollar 
investigation of Holy Land and a high-profile announcement of the charity’s blacklisting by 
President George W. Bush himself.  Id.  The government pressed ahead with a second trial, securing 
convictions against all defendants.  United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 484 (5th Cir. 2011).  
The defendants appealed, claiming that, among other things, the trial judge’s allowing of two Israeli 
security agents to testify under complete anonymity (identities were kept secret from the defendants 
and their lawyers) violated the Confrontation Clause.  Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the 
Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari.  Id. 
 130.  Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 688-689. 
 131.  Id. at 689 n.1. 
 132.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, No. 3:04-CR-0240-P, *20 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 
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of a due process violation, the court denied the motion to expunge.133 
NAIT appealed, claiming that the lower court abused its discretion 
by “sealing its order, by refusing to expunge NAIT’s name from 
[Attachment A], and by engaging in an irrelevant and erroneous analysis 
of NAIT’s connections to the [HLF] defendants and other entities.”134  
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court judge abused his discretion 
by sealing his opinion and order.  By finding that NAIT’s due process 
rights were violated, while at the same time sealing that declaration, 
along with the rest of his opinion and order, the district court judge left 
“NAIT hamstrung in its ability to mitigate the damage done by its public 
identification as a possible coconspirator in the activities of the HLF 
Defendants.”135 
Sealing the opinion and order was the only act of reversible error 
found by the Court of Appeals.  In upholding the denial of the motion to 
expunge, the court looked at two factors: (1) “the degree to which the 
inclusion of the name is merely repetition of allegations raised by the 
Government and subjected to judicial scrutiny in other proceedings,” and 
(2) “the particular context in which an accusation was made.”136  The 
court concluded that even though NAIT did not have “the opportunity to 
vindicate itself in formal criminal proceedings . . . proceedings at trial 
did include some context for NAIT’s inclusion, in the form of evidence 
tending to support some past ties between NAIT and the HLF.”137 
It is worth recalling that the government had accused NAIT, as well 
as all of the other unindicted co-conspirators in the case, as being 
“dedicated to sustaining and furthering the Hamas movement.”138  The 
court, however, reasoned that since the government did not attempt to 
enter hearsay statements by NAIT at trial, no judicial opinion as to the 
weight of the government’s accusations took place, meaning that 
“NAIT’s inclusion in the brief was simply an untested allegation of the 
Government, made in anticipation of a possible evidentiary dispute that 
never came to pass.”139 
The Court of Appeals asserted that the district court went outside 
 
2009) (Investigative Project on Terrorism), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/ 
documents/case_docs/1425.pdf. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 688.  Neither CAIR nor ISNA joined the appeal.  Id. 
at 689, n.1. 
 135.  Id. at 690. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 691. 
 138.  Id. at 688. 
 139.  Id. at 693. 
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the bounds of both what was required to resolve the Fifth Amendment 
and Rule 801(d)(2)(E) questions, but nonetheless declined to “‘vacate’ 
the analysis of the opinion and order, because our review is of its 
holding, not every step of its reasoning or its choice of words.”140 
By ignoring the lower court’s foray “outside the bounds” of the 
appropriate inquiries, the Court of Appeals allowed the same type of ex 
post facto dismissal of due process violations that a previous panel of the 
Fifth Circuit in In re Smith refused to condone.141  What concerned the 
court in In re Smith was the violation of due process when it occurred at 
the pre-trial stage, and not whether those whose rights were violated may 
in fact have been involved in criminal activity.142  The court’s concern 
was that implicating someone “in criminal conduct without affording 
him a forum for vindication” works to obliterate the “presumption of 
innocence,” which is a bedrock of procedural due process.143  
Furthermore, the unsealing of the district court judge’s opinion and order 
provided mere illusory relief.  The Court of Appeals, however, found an 
actual constitutional violation.  On the other hand, the court found that 
the point was moot because prosecutors would have met their burden of 
establishing petitioners as co-conspirators/joint-venturers during an 
evidentiary hearing at trial. 
Putting aside the procedural battles over whether and what kind of 
relief the unindicted co-conspirators in the HLF case were due, it is 
important to look at the reputational damage and other injuries that 
resulted from being publicly accused of criminal involvement in such a 
high profile terrorism-financing case.  It is without question that CAIR 
has suffered the most harm. 
In its order to seal those pre-trial documents that listed the names of 
the unindicted co-conspirators, the district court summarized the impact 
that the designation had on CAIR: 
[T]he release of the List subjected CAIR to annoyance, ridicule, scorn, 
and loss of reputation in the community.  CAIR has been subjected to 
violent threats and has been made the subject of news stories and arti-
cles.  It is reasonable to surmise that donations to CAIR have and will 
suffer as a result of the designation.144 
 
 140.  Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d at 694. 
 141.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (“[W]e completely fail to 
perceive how the interests of criminal justice was advanced at the time of the plea hearings by such 
an attack on the Petitioner’s character.”).  
 142.  See id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, No. 3:04-CR-0240-P, *10 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 
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The designation also produced an adverse reaction from law 
enforcement.  The FBI instituted a policy banning its agents from 
holding meetings with CAIR officials or collaborating with CAIR, as it 
had in the past, on community outreach, terrorism-prevention, and civil 
rights.  When asked during congressional hearings about the impetus 
behind the FBI’s anti-CAIR policy, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller 
confirmed that the policy was triggered by CAIR’s designation as an 
unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case.145 
The FBI’s dramatic policy shift on CAIR drew the attention of 
CAIR’s opponents in Congress.  Representative Frank Wolf, the then 
Ranking Member on the House Commerce, Justice, Science 
Appropriations Subcommittee, delivered a lengthy floor speech on June 
12, 2009 dedicated solely to the subject of CAIR, the naming of the 
organization as an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case, and the 
FBI’s blacklisting of the organization.146  Rep. Wolf cited court filings in 
which the government described CAIR as “‘having conspired with other 
affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists . . . [and] used 
deception to conceal from the American public their connections to 
terrorists . . . .”147  Rep. Wolf further cited the government’s response to 
CAIR’s court challenge to the unindicted co-conspirator designations in 
the HLF case: “‘CAIR has been identified by the government at trial as a 
participant in an ongoing and ultimately unlawful conspiracy to support 
a designated terrorist organization, a conspiracy from which CAIR never 
withdrew.’”148 
As Chairman of the House Commerce, Justice, Science, and 
Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee, Rep. Wolf attached a report to a 2012 appropriations bill 
that supported the FBI’s anti-CAIR policy.149  A section titled “Liaison 
partnerships” reads: 
Liaison Partnerships - The Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) was listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in a case in which 
the Holy Land Foundation was found guilty of material support of a 
terrorist organization.  The Committee acknowledges the Attorney 
 
2009) (Investigative Project on Terrorism), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/ 
documents/case_docs/1425.pdf. 
 145.  Fiscal Year 2013 Budget for the Fed. Bureau of Investigation: Hearing of the Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcomm. of the H. Appropriations Comm., FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2012. 
 146.  155 CONG. REC. H6669 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Wolf). 
 147.  Id. at *6672. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-463, at Committee Reports (2011-2012). 
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General’s refusal to attend certain meetings knowing that CAIR offi-
cials would be present, as indicated in testimony before the Commit-
tee . . . . The Committee understands that the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) has an existing policy prohibiting its employees from 
engaging in any formal non-investigative cooperation with CAIR.  The 
Committee encourages the Attorney General to adopt a similar policy 
for all Department officials.150 
 In spring 2011, Rep. Peter King, then Chairman of the House 
Homeland Security Committee, conducted his first in a series of 
hearings on “Islamic radicalization.”  Although no member of CAIR 
testified at the hearing, CAIR itself was repeatedly mentioned in the 
context of its unindicted co-conspirator designation in the HLF case, and 
members of Congress openly accused CAIR of being a terrorist 
organization.  Washington Post reporter Glenn Kessler investigated the 
accusations and insinuations made against CAIR during that hearing, 
summarizing his column this way: “The repeated references to CAIR 
being an ‘unindicted co-conspirator’ is one of those true facts that 
ultimately gives a false impression.’”151 
Of the numerous organizations listed as unindicted co-conspirators 
in the HLF case, CAIR is the only one that the FBI has taken an official 
stance against.  The following is an exchange between FBI Director 
Mueller and Rep. Frank Wolf during a March 7, 2012 hearing: 
 
 REP. WOLF: Well, as I understand it, that one of the 
reasons why FBI has a specific policy regarding CAIR is 
that CAIR was listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
Holy Land Foundation case. 
 MR. MUELLER: That’s correct. 
 REP. WOLF: Yeah.  Do you have other non-engagement 
policies with others who were unindicted co-conspirators in 
the Holy Land Foundation case? 
 MR. MUELLER: At this juncture, I don’t think so.152 
  
It is important to note that CAIR has never been charged with a crime, 
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Glenn Kessler, The King Hearings: Is CAIR a “Terrorist Organization?,” WASH. POST, 
Mar. 10, 2011, 4:25 PM, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2011/03/the_king_hearings 
_is_cair_a_te.html. 
 152.  Fiscal Year 2013 Budget for the Fed. Bureau of Investigation: Hearing of the Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcomm. of the H. Appropriations Comm., FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2012. 
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and to this day, it retains its IRS status as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
organization.153  One would assume that if the FBI had the evidence to 
back up its assertions as well as the innuendo emanating from its action 
that CAIR is somehow involved in supporting terrorism, that it would 
have brought criminal charges against CAIR.  However, it has not done 
so. 
By not being able—or willing—to indict CAIR, the FBI has chosen 
to take the extraordinary step of publicly turning CAIR into a pariah 
because of its designation as an unindicted co-conspirator.  That some 
congressional leaders have encouraged the FBI’s blacklisting of a law-
abiding, tax-exempt, civil rights organization without ever holding a 
proper hearing regarding the matter or giving CAIR officials a chance to 
respond, underscores the necessity for providing unindicted co-
conspirators better due process protections and remedies. 
Indeed, the FBI’s anti-CAIR policy, along with congressional 
support for that policy, would likely have come about whether or not the 
unindicted co-conspirators list was made public before trial since CAIR 
was named an unindicted co-conspirator during the trial.  Thus, it was 
not just the public naming, but also the designation itself that led to 
CAIR being selectively targeted for blacklisting.  This result reasonably 
leads to the conclusion that as far as the government and Congress are 
concerned, CAIR is guilty until it proves itself innocent. 
Such a public condemnation by two of the three federal branches 
fails to conform with the constitutional guarantee that “[n]o person shall 
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . without due process of 
law . . . .”154  As the late journalist Edward R. Murrow stated so 
poignantly during the height of the anti-communist McCarthyism era, “It 
is necessary to investigate before legislating, but the line between 
investigating and persecuting is a very fine one . . . . We must remember 
always that accusation is not proof and that conviction depends upon 
evidence and due process of law.”155 
In sharp contrast to its approach to CAIR, the government dropped 
its initial opposition to ISNA and NAIT’s petition for equitable relief, 
and went a step further in announcing that it not only made a mistake by 
 
 153.  CAIR at a Glance, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/CAIRataGlance.aspx#TaxID. 
 154.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 155.  Edward R. Murrow, See It Now: A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (CBS 
television broadcast Mar. 9, 1954), transcript available at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/ 
murrowmccarthy.html. 
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not filing the list of unindicted co-conspirators in the HLF case under 
seal, but that it made a mistake in listing ISNA and NAIT as unindicted 
co-conspirators in the first place.  According to a press release issued by 
the American Civil Liberties Union, which represented the organizations 
in their petition to the court, 
The government conceded . . . that it had absolutely no evidence prov-
ing that either ISNA or NAIT had engaged in a criminal conspiracy.  
The lead prosecutor in the case told lawyers for the two organizations 
“that ISNA and NAIT were not subjects or targets in the HLF prosecu-
tion or in any other pending investigation.”  The prosecutor also 
acknowledged that the public labeling was simply a “legal tactic” in-
tended to allow the government to introduce hearsay evidence against 
HLF later at trial.156 
That prosecutors made mistakes in both listing ISNA and NAIT as 
unindicted co-conspirators and in making the unindicted co-conspirators 
list public underscores the need for strengthening due process 
protections. 
C. Remedies Do Not Always Provide Relief 
It is a fundamental tenet of common law jurisprudence that “for 
every right there is a remedy.”157  Surprisingly, however, few remedies 
are available to individuals whose due process rights have been violated 
by being publicly named as unindicted co-conspirators.  The courts in 
the cases cited supra in Parts III.A-B, did not hesitate to identify due 
process violations when they believed such violations occurred.  What is 
apparent from those cases, however, is the fact that even after a court 
determines that an unindicted co-conspirator’s due process rights were 
violated, judicial relief has neither been automatic, nor has it always 
been meaningful. 
While better remedies are needed to redress harm after the fact, the 
focus of this Comment is on prevention of the harm in the first instance.  
This is because no remedy can truly place an unindicted co-conspirator 
in the position that she was in before she was publicly named. 
 
 156.  Press Release, ACLU Challenges Government’s Stigmatizing of Mainstream Muslim 
Groups in Holy Land Case, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 18, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-challenges-governments-stigmatizing-mainstream-
muslim-groups-holy-land-case. 
 157.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).  Chief Justice Marshall, in his survey of the 
common law, quoted Justice Blackstone, who wrote, “[I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the 
laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper 
redress.”  Id. 
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Named unindicted co-conspirators who demonstrate that their due 
process rights were violated may petition the court to strike from the pre-
trial record all references to their names.  Such relief was sought, and 
ultimately granted, to petitioners in Briggs, where the court ordered that 
the district court clerk “expunge from Count One of the indictment . . . 
all references to appellants.”158  Expungement was also granted in In re 
Smith, where the Court of Appeals ordered the district court clerk to 
“obliterate and strike from the records . . . any and all identifying 
references to or name of Mr. Smith, the Petitioner, so that such 
references may not be used as a public record to impugn the reputation 
of Petitioner.”159 
Relief is not automatic though, as the decision of whether or not to 
order expungement is within the discretion of the court.160  The court in 
Anderson, in accord with its finding of a denial of due process for 
naming unindicted co-conspirators in pre-trial filings, ordered that the 
names of the unindicted co-conspirators be stricken from the pre-trial 
record.161  At the same time, the court denied a motion to strike two of 
the petitioners’ names from the entire record, holding that they “did not 
suffer a due process deprivation in connection with the government’s 
identification of them as coconspirators for 801(d)(2)(E) purposes at 
trial.”162  The distinction made by the court between naming unindicted 
co-conspirators before as opposed to during trial, was that 
[T]he government’s identification of the movants as 801(d)(2)(E) co-
conspirators at trial does not allow for the reasonable inference that 
they are criminals.  In contrast to the trial identification, however, the 
government’s unqualified identification of the movants as unindicted 
coconspirators in its pretrial moving papers allows for the reasonable 
inference that they have been labeled criminals.163 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals in Holy Land 
Foundation, where the offending pre-trial document naming all 
unindicted co-conspirators was ordered sealed, while the petitioners’ 
 
 158.  United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 808 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 159.  In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). 
 160.  United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 720 F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1983) (“We review 
decisions on requests to expunge by an abuse of discretion standard granting a range of latitude to 
the district court.”); United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A 
district court has broad discretion to consider the circumstances of each case, and a decision not to 
expunge will not necessarily be an abuse of that discretion.”). 
 161.  United States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1169 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 1169-70. 
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motion to expunge the record was denied.164  “Just as the context of a 
party’s naming as a possible co-conspirator in a criminal case is relevant 
to whether the naming was wrongful and whether it should be sealed, 
context is relevant to whether the naming of a party should be 
expunged.”165  The court appeared to be emphasizing the point that each 
type of relief requested by NAIT had to be evaluated in light of “both the 
source and method of the accusation” made against it.166 
By placing emphasis on context, the court was able to reach the 
conclusion that on the one hand, unsealing the district court’s opinion 
was warranted because it contained a judicial finding that NAIT’s due 
process rights were violated as a result of its being publicly named as an 
unindicted co-conspirator in pre-trial papers.  On the other hand, 
however, the appeals court held that expunging the record was not 
warranted since “[t]he allegation was offered in furtherance of a 
legitimate purpose-albeit a purpose that could have been equally well-
served by filing Attachment A under seal.”167 
Having identified the constitutional concerns with publicly naming 
unindicted co-conspirators and the attendant harms that may result from 
such a designation, it is important to explore solutions that might strike a 
better balance between the legitimate interests of the government in 
trying criminal cases, and the equally legitimate interest of unindicted 
co-conspirators in their due process rights. 
IV. PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES THAT BETTER PROTECT DUE PROCESS 
Having highlighted several instances in which unindicted co-
conspirators have been injured by the public disclosure of their names, 
this Comment now turns to solutions.  If adopted, these proposed 
solutions may go a long way toward preventing future harm to 
unindicted co-conspirators, while at the same time preserving the ability 
of federal prosecutors to effectively prosecute criminal cases. 
The due process rights of unindicted co-conspirators will be better 
protected if the label “unindicted co-conspirator” is abandoned and 
replaced with a more value-neutral designation, if the USAM is updated 
to explicitly prohibit the naming of unindicted co-conspirators in 
indictments, and if procedural rules are changed to require, as a matter of 
 
 164.  United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685, 685 (5th Cir. 2010). It is worth 
noting that the court order sealing the pre-trial document came two years after it was made public 
and after the two trials in the underlying criminal matter.  Id. at 689. 
 165.  Id. at 692. 
 166.  Id. at 691. 
 167.  Id. at 693. 
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course, that all pre-trial filings naming unindicted co-conspirators be 
done under seal. 
A. Abandon the Label “Unindicted Co-Conspirator” 
One of the most potent, yet simple, ways that the reputational and 
economic interests that underpin the due process rights of unindicted co-
conspirators can be preserved is by abandoning the use of the term 
“unindicted co-conspirator,” and replacing it with a term that is more 
value-neutral and innocuous, such as “joint venturer,” “special witness,” 
or “material actor.” 
Federal Rules of Evidence § 801(d)(2)(E) already applies to joint 
venturers in the same way that it does to unindicted co-conspirators.168  
Rule 801’s legislative history includes a report from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that states, “[I]t is this committee’s understanding that the 
rule is meant to carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a 
joint venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this 
rule even though no conspiracy has been charged.”169  If there is no 
practical difference between using the term joint venturer instead of co-
conspirator for purposes of the Hearsay Exception Rule, then the 
government should not object to a revision of the Rule that fully 
embraces the former while discarding the latter. 
“Special witness” and “material actor” are examples of new labels 
that could be adopted.  Such labels are preferable, as they do not carry 
the stigma that “co-conspirator” does.  Thus, even if the name of a 
“special witness” or “material actor” is made public, either before or 
during trial, the use of such a benign-sounding designation may greatly 
reduce the risk of stigmatization, as well as the harms that flow from that 
stigmatization. 
B.  Improve Prosecutor Guidelines 
Over time, the Justice Department has moved from defending the 
naming of unindicted co-conspirators in an indictment—its position in 
Briggs—to later citing Briggs as the major authority underlining its 
present policy that “[i]n the absence of some significant justification, 
federal prosecutors generally should not identify unindicted co-
conspirators in conspiracy indictments.”170 
 
 168.  See FED. R. EVID. 802(d)(2)(E); Notes of Committee on the Judiciary; S. REP. NO. 93–
1277. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47. 
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Despite the strength of its sentiment, the policy falls short of 
making an outright ban on the naming of unindicted co-conspirators, 
while at the same time failing to explain what exactly constitutes a 
“significant justification,” or to whom the decision to publicly name 
someone should be justified.  Such a gap opens the door to 
inconsistency, mistake, and misuse.  Instituting an outright ban on the 
naming of unindicted co-conspirators in indictments will close this gap 
and provide Assistant U.S. Attorneys across the country with a uniform 
standard that can be applied equally in all situations. 
While developing such a uniform standard, the Justice Department 
should also detail disciplinary penalties that prosecutors would face for 
violating this standard.  It is prosecutors who draft the text of 
indictments.  Therefore, they should be the ones who are held 
accountable for violating a policy whose purpose is to protect the 
constitutional rights of unindicted persons. 
C.  All Filings Should Be Done Under Seal 
The concerns for due process that are raised in the naming of 
unindicted co-conspirators in indictments do not change when the 
context is shifted to pre-trial filings and hearings.  The court in Briggs 
did make a distinction between naming in an indictment and naming in a 
bill of particulars or at trial.  The latter two situations would not violate 
due process, according to the Briggs court, because “in the process of 
balancing private injury and governmental interests . . ., wholly 
different, and valid governmental interests apply.”171  At the same time, 
the court conceded that the impact of publicly naming an unindicted co-
conspirator in a bill of particulars “may be tempered by protective orders 
entered by the court.”172 
The trend in this regard has shifted as more recent decisions reveal 
that unlike in Briggs, the distinction is made between making public the 
name of an unindicted co-conspirator in any pre-trial context, and 
making the name public at trial, with the former constituting a violation 
of due process, and the latter constituting a necessary burden placed 
upon the co-conspirator in the interests of justice.  From this bright-line 
distinction flows the logical conclusion that rules should be adopted 
requiring that, as a matter of course, pre-trial documents naming 
unindicted co-conspirators be filed under seal. 
More than 90 percent of federal criminal cases end in pre-trial plea 
 
 171.  United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 805 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 172.  Id. 
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bargains.173  This means that in the overwhelming majority of cases 
where prosecutors have designated unindicted co-conspirators so that 
they may later introduce evidence under the hearsay exception, they will 
never have to actually make the names of those unindicted co-
conspirators public at a Rule 801 evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, the 
reputational, economic, and other interests of unindicted co-conspirators 
may receive maximum protection by requiring that any pre-trial filings 
that would otherwise make their names public be filed under seal.  If this 
prescription is adopted, there likely will be little-to-no public association 
made between the unindicted co-conspirators and the alleged criminal 
acts of the defendants.  Such an outcome would achieve the desired 
effect of preserving the status quo ante while avoiding personal injury 
and threats to due process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Avoiding violations of the Constitution is a duty of all officers of 
the court—prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges.174  By working 
together to strengthen the due process rights of unindicted co-
conspirators, judges and lawyers will necessarily strengthen our legal 
system and add a modicum of fairness and justice that has been lacking.  
Doing more to protect the due process rights of unindicted co-
conspirators will also promote judicial efficiency by reducing “the 
generation of collateral appeals and the draining of resources best spent 
more productively.”175 
Undoubtedly, prosecutors are no more interested in violating the 
rights of citizens than are citizens interested in having their rights 
violated, for “[i]t is as much [a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”176 
To be sure, not every unindicted co-conspirator is free from 
culpability.  Yet, the only ways, generally speaking, that our system of 
justice allows for a person to be found guilty of a crime is if that person 
admits guilt or if the government proves as such beyond a reasonable 
 
 173.  How Courts Work, Criminal Cases, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, (Feb. 
23, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourts 
Work/CriminalCases.aspx. 
 174.  Preamble, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1 (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal 
profession, is . . . an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for 
the quality of justice.”). 
 175.  United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 720 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 176.  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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doubt before a tribunal where the accused can be heard.  Unindicted co-
conspirators do not fit into either category.  Hence, if the law presumes 
that the indicted are innocent until proven guilty, then the unindicted 
must be presumed to be innocent—period. 
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